יח לענין גט כולי עלמא לא פליגי דחצר משום ידה איתרבאי כי פליגי לענין מציאה מ"ס
18 whereas it is held by us<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. Kid. 42b. ');"><sup>18</sup></span> that there is no agent for a sinful act?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., if one commits an illegal act on the instruction of someone else the guilt rests upon the performer of the act, and not upon the one who gave the instruction, as each person is bound to obey the law given by the Supreme Master, and one has no right to carry out the instruction of another person if it is contrary to the divine Law. ');"><sup>19</sup></span> — Rabina answered: We say 'there is no agent for a sinful act' only when the agent is subject to the law prohibiting the act, but in regard to [a thief's] 'ground', which cannot be said to be subject to the law prohibiting the act [of stealing] the responsibility [does not lie with the agent, but it] lies with the originator [of the deed]. But if so — what if one says to a woman or a slave: 'Go and steal for me,' seeing that they are not subject to the law prohibiting the act [of stealing].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' At least so far as the penalties involved are concerned, as they are unable to pay. Cf. B.K. 87a. ');"><sup>20</sup></span> does the responsibility in this case also lie with the originator [of the deed]? — I will tell you: A woman and a slave are subject to the law prohibiting [theft], only they are temporarily unable to pay,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The married woman cannot pay because she cannot dispose of her property without her husband's consent, and the slave because everything he has belongs to his master, ');"><sup>21</sup></span> as we learnt: When the woman has been divorced and the slave set free, they are obliged to pay.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For an injury they caused in their previous state, while they were unable to pay (B.K. 87a). ');"><sup>22</sup></span> R. Sama said: When do we say, 'there is no agent for a sinful act'? — [Only in a case] where [the agent is at liberty to choose: to] do it if he wishes, and not do it if he does not wish. But in regard to a 'ground' [where. e.g., a stolen animal is found], seeing that it has no will but must receive [what is deposited therein, the responsibility lies with the originator [e.g., of the theft]. Wherein do they differ?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' What practical difference is there in the views expressed by Rabina and R. Sama? ');"><sup>23</sup></span> — They differ [in the case where] a priest says to an Israelite: 'Go and betroth for me a divorced woman'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' A priest may not take to wife a divorced woman. (Lev. XXI, 7.) Betrothal marks the two parties concerned husband and wife. ');"><sup>24</sup></span> or [where] a man says to a woman:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' A woman is not subject to the prohibition of rounding the corners of the head (Lev. XIX, 27) as she is not subject to the prohibition contained in the second half of the same Biblical verse, neither shalt thou mar the corners of thy beard. Cf. Kid. 35b; Naz. 57b. ');"><sup>25</sup></span> 'Cut around the corners of the hair of a minor:'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' A minor is mentioned for the reason that an adult will not allow anyone to round the corners of his head, as the Biblical prohibition applies to 'rounding' as well as to 'being rounded'. ');"><sup>26</sup></span> according to the version which says that whenever [the agent has the choice to] do it if he wishes, and not to do it if he does not wish, the responsibility does not lie with the originator; here also he has the choice to do if he wishes and not to do it if he does not wish, [and therefore] the responsibility does not lie with the originator. But according to the version which says that whenever the agent is not subject to the law prohibiting the act, the responsibility lies with the originator, in these [cases] also, seeing that [the agents] are not subject to the laws prohibiting the acts, the responsibility lies with the originators. But is there anyone who says that 'ground' is not included in [the term] 'hand'? Has it not been taught: [<i>And he shall give it</i>] <i>in her hand</i><span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Deut. XXIV, 3. ');"><sup>27</sup></span> — from this I would learn only that 'her hand' acts for her. How do we know [that] her roof, her courtyard and her enclosed space [also act for her]? Because the Scriptural verse emphasises, '<i>And he shall give'</i>, [which implies that he may give it to her] anywhere.?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The term [H] 'and he shall give' is taken as having no exclusive reference to the following word [H] ('in her hand'). Had the emphasis been restricted to 'in her hand' the term used would have been [H] (Rashi). The inference therefore is that any place belonging to her, i.e. her 'ground', is as good as her 'hand', and not because the place is her 'agent', for the fact that the woman can appoint an agent in connection with either marriage or divorce is already indicated in this verse by the word [H] 'he shall send her' (cf. Kid., 41a), and need not be indicated again by [H]. Git. 77a. ');"><sup>28</sup></span> With regard to a divorce there is no difference of opinion [and all agree] that 'ground' is included in her 'hand'. The difference of opinion exists only as regards a found object: One<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' R. Johanan. ');"><sup>29</sup></span> is of the opinion that